Admitting Defeat

Kevin Drum on the CNN/USA Today poll numbers for the Iraq War:

"If you add up the numbers, 63% of Americans think it's still possible for us to win in Iraq. And no matter what they tell pollsters, my guess is that anyone who thinks we're capable of winning the war won't trust a politician who advocates withdrawal. This is the Democratic dilemma in a nutshell, and it probably explains this Knight Ridder report:

"'Nationally known Democratic war critics, including Howard Dean, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and Sens. Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, Russell Feingold of Wisconsin and John Kerry of Massachusetts, won't attend what sponsors say will be a big anti-war rally Saturday in Washington.'

"For more on this, see Lorelei Kelly. As a conservative journalist told her today, "The liberals were pretty much right on Viet Nam. And what did that get them? They destroyed their reputation on national security for three decades." I have a feeling that's a widespread attitude."

I wonder if Americans actually understand what victory in war really means. World War II is the war we typically refer to whenever we set off on a military adventure. Images of Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler, the press for total subjugation of Germany military forces, and Parisians dancing in the streets were used as metaphors to help us understand the stakes in the War with Iraq. The UN, ostensibly, was Chamberlain, weakly offering concessions to the maniacal aggressor Hussein. The objective of our forces was nothing less than an advance to Baghdad, just as the allies had pushed into Berlin. And our forces, like the forces that liberated France, were to be greated with flowers and parades.

Why did these metaphors fail to match the realities of this war? Because, in almost every way, World War II was an anomaly in the history of warfare. Very seldom in human history has a figure like Hitler risen to power in a state capable of conducting war on a global scale, and then used that power as aggressively as Hitler did. Hitler not only felt a need to attack and conquer his neighbors, but he also felt that this had to be accomplished as quickly as possible. Nazi ideology, unlike that of Soviet Communism, made it necessary for Hitler, personally, as the one leader destiny chose for the Reich, to accomplish his mission to acquire lebensraum and annihilate the Jews while he was still young enough to carry it through. (He turned fifty the year the war began). Nazi ideology permitted no compromises with enemy powers, nor tactical withdrawls from tenuous positions. This made him impossible to deal with by any means short of total victory. We could not, as we did at the end of World War I and most conflicts in years and ages past, conclude the war by a negotiated settlement.

Hussein, obnoxious and thuggish though he was, was not Adolf Hitler. He did not pose a unique threat. His assaults on his neighbors--the Iranians and the Kuwaitis--were bloody and expensive to reverse, but were reversed without the need to press into Baghdad and overthrow the regime. Even the Iranians, who despised Hussein, were able to reach a negotiated settlement to end the Iran-Iraq war. Though Hussein does subscribe to a crude kind of pan-Arabism, he never possessed the military or economic resources to make himself a hegemon, much less the undisputed master of the region. He was, at most, a local irritant, a sociopathic thief who robbed and murdered his own people. He was clearly no good for the Iraqi people, but was not the serious threat to those living far outside his borders that Hitler was.

Further, Hussein, unlike Hitler, was sensitive to outside pressure. In the months before the invasion, Hussein had allowed inspectors into his country to examine WMD sites. He did his best to slow them down, not so much because he wanted to conceal his chemical and biological weapons as because he didn't want his enemies inside Iraq to know that he didn't have chemical and biological weapons. Hussein was, in comparison with Hitler, a rational actor, and would back down if clearly outnumbered and outgunned. Up to the moment the war was launched, the possibility that the whole Iraq question could be resolved through diplomacy was still out there.

The metaphor connecting the UN (or France) with Chamberlain also fails under scrutiny. By the time Chamberlain went to Munich, the Germans had already annexed the Saarland, remilitarized the Rheinland, murdered the Austrian president, and annexed Austria. It was tragically clear what Hitler was after by the time Chamberlain met with him in Munich. Appeasement was not only a disaster, but a predictable one, given the character of Hitler's regime. The outstanding question with Iraq was, if the UN had gotten its way and the inspectors had been allowed more time to complete their examination of suspected Iraqi WMD sites, what would the harm have been? Was Saddam about to invade another country? Was he, at the time, even threatening to do so? How indeed, would allowing the inspectors, whom Saddam didn't want in his country at all, to continue their work constitute appeasement?

We need look no farther than the news dispatches from Iraq to realize that our armies were greeted with rather more explosives than flowers. This too was predictable. Iraq's major ethnic groups have had incompatible political goals ever since the British manufactured modern Iraq in its partition of the Ottoman Empire's old holdings. This has not changed and will not change. Ethnic ambitions are almost impossible to supress without the application of spectacular amounts of violence and intimidation, and even then, they fester and wait for the oppressor (whether native or foreign) to tire. So it will be in Iraq. The Iraqis, when they're not too busy killing one another, will kill us until we leave.

And don't let's start the nonsense about there not being enough troops in Iraq. We don't have, and did not have before the invasion, enough troops for this sort of mission. Our military resources, already somewhat strained by Afghanistan, were broken in Iraq. Recruitment has collapsed. We're shoveling billions of dollars into the fire just to get the horrible results we're getting now. We don't have what it takes, and neither does the rest of the world. And while it would be nice to get other nations involved in bailing Iraq out, it's questionable that they would do so because they would see it as sending good money in after bad. Why should the French or the Germans or the Russians, who told us not to go in, now sacrifice their blood and treasure because we insisted on ignoring them? In the meantime, as we saw with Katrina, we've blown both financial and human resources that we need to cover our own problems on our adventure in Iraq.

I don't know what victory in Iraq would look like, but I know a defeat when I see one. Aside from overthrowing Saddam, we have failed in every political and military aim that this war was supposed to gain for us. We are isolated from the world. We're still under terrorist threat. We've exposed our inability to cope with terrorist threats. We've created a new middle eastern hegemon in Iran. We've emboldened the North Koreans, and we've produced a simmering civil war in Iraq that will propogate new and exotic terrorist threats in the future. I'd love to think that we still have cards to play there, but we don't. We can withdraw now, and admit failure, or we can take more casualties, withdraw later, and admit failure. If Americans can't see that, it's because they're still deluding themselves with glorious memories of a war that bears no resemblance to what's going on in Iraq.

As George Kennan put it:

"Except for our own Civil War, which was quite a different thing and was fought for a different purpose, our involvements with the use of armed force in the modern age have occurred primarily in the confusing and to some extent misleading experiences of the two world wars of the [20th] century. Both these wars ended in unconditional surrender, encouraging us in a view that the purpose of war was not to bring about a mutally advantageous compromise with an external adversary seen as totally evil and inhuman, but to destroy completely the power and will of that adversary."

Our distorted, World War II/Greatest Generation view of warfare led us to suffer greatly in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and now in Iraq. How long do we have to bleed before we realize that our country can lose, has lost, and is losing? What kind of national security can we expect to have if our leaders can't tell the difference between a win and a loss, and don't know what's at stake when they take risks in foreign affairs? What has our erroneous conviction that America has never lost a war (not counting, I guess, the War of 1812 and Vietnam) done to the way we approach armed conflict? In light of this poll, I have to wonder about the 65% of the American people who see a prospect for success where there is none. It is a shame that Democratic politicians won't take the trouble to cure America of this delusion, because when a nation's politicians are no longer capable of responding to the realities of the world, it isn't long before the barbarians arrive at that nation's gates.

We're headed for a lot of grief, aren't we?