Pseudohistory and Its Discontents

M.Y. posted again today about Yalta, saying that two contrarian writers (one in the New Republic and the other in Reason) made convincing cases concerning why Bush tried to reframe Yalta as an foul bargain between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. He goes on to say this:

"Now this doesn't change the fact that the Yalta agreement was not, in fact, a great world-historical crime on the part of the Roosevelt Administration, but a little historical inaccuracy is more than forgiveable in pursuit of legitimate diplomatic objectives."

I'm not sure I'm 100% with you on your police work there, Matt. What Bush was doing in his speech was not tactfully eliding certain ugly historical truths for the sake of amity, nor was he saying, as members of the Clinton administration did in the early 1990s, that the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the Yalta framework could now be abandoned in favor of a happier state of Eastern European affairs. Bush was falsifying history in order to improve his political standing and justify his current ideological stances. He also did it to reduce the standing of FDR in American political history and, in doing so, justify the conservative assault on his legacy at home.

That Bush's version of history is, in fact, false, is already clear by a preponderance of the historical evidence, and needn't be further argued here. What makes it even more morally questionable is that, while the lie that he's telling undoubtedly pleases those in his audience (both in Poland and the U.S.) who would prefer to believe it and may give the U.S. a temporary image boost, it also confers upon the Eastern Europeans the status of being, at least partly, the U.S.'s victim. Claims of victimhood are potent stuff in world affairs. Countries and peoples go to war over victimhood claims that go back hundreds or even thousands of years. It is, therefore, deeply dangerous to base such claims on lies. Whatever short-term advantages Bush's "admission" may confer, it is, in the long term, a bad thing for people in Eastern Europe to stick us with the blame for their repression under Russian occupation. It will lead to distortions of policy that will hurt us, and, perversely, may come to benefit the Russians, who can now claim us as a partner in their crimes. It also may mean that the next time we make an agreement with the Russians over anything--defense policy, climate change--Eastern European governments could feel justified in saying, "See, just like Yalta!" Why this should be desirable is frankly beyond me. There are times when fudging the truth is necessary in diplomacy, but the promotion of this pseudohistory will distort our relationship with Eastern Europe in ways that will take many years to undo, assuming it ever is undone.

Also, it is deeply naive to imagine that any President speaking abroad is speaking only to his foreign audience. Every Presidential speech delivered overseas is drafted and redrafted with the American public in mind. The Poles may applaud, but they don't vote here, and USAToday/Gallup doesn't call them to measure Bush's approval rating. The notion that nobody in the U.S. saw it or knew about it is absurd. I commented on the story the day I saw it, May 7th, when it was on top of my Yahoo AP headlines list. I'm a busy person, and certainly wouldn't have gone digging through the international pages in search of the item. (Most of the time, I'm beyond caring what Bush says, because so far as I've known he has never stepped up to a microphone to which he hasn't lied.) Bush knew his words would reach a domestic political audience when he spoke them, and the manner in which he framed them--which cast Roosevelt as a perpetrator of a crime against freedom and himself as a consistent, unbending liberator--was meant to benefit his standing at home and tarnish the legacy of a man whose political accomplishments, at home and overseas, Bush is committed to destroying.

What could Bush have said? He could have said, "America and the West are committed to supporting you as your build and sustain your democratic governments and institutions. We are delighted that the Yalta framework is no longer relevant to our relationship. We salute you for your resiliance under Soviet domination and for your willingness to fight for your own liberty. Please know that we will always come to your aid when called." Cynical as I am about Bush's committment to freedom anywhere, I still wouldn't have objected. Like most political rhetoric, it may not have been true, but at least it could have been true. At worst, it would have been no worse than all the other wind that blows, at various velocities, in diplomatic circles. It, or something along its lines, would have accomplished just as well any legitimate political purpose the administration might have had. No, Bush's pseudohistorical rant served an entirely different purpose: to convince the unwary, once again, that Bush is greater than those who came before him--that, while other American leaders have erred, he is perfect.